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Abstract
In this paper we want to assess if the positive association between
individual earnings and local average education is due to human capital
externalities or just reflects some ommitted factors. Using a sample of
displaced workers, we take into account firm characteristics as well as in-
dividual fixed eﬀects. We find that, on average educational externalities
are quite small, however it seems that these externalities are not captured
equally by diﬀerent types of individuals. More educated workers benefit
from a highly-educated environment relative to workers with lower lev-
els of education (about 3% more) and these gains are not all acquired
immediately, but through time.
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1 Introduction
Human capital externalities, and particularly educational externalities, play a
prominent role in many recent endogenous growth models, but also in the litera-
ture on city formation, neighborhood eﬀects and, more generally, in discussions
of income inequality. The economic rationalization of the government subsidies
to private education is based on the belief that there are important external
eﬀects from increased schooling attainment. However the obvious question that
has not been empirically clearly answered, is wether the private return diﬀer
from the social return to education (Card, 1999). In fact, the literature avail-
able is almost entirely on the private rather social returns to education, and
only very few studies try to design an analytic approach that credibly generates
a consistent estimate of the causal eﬀect of interest.
Although, there is no doubt that exists a positive correlation between local
average education and individual wages, even after controlling for individual
observable characteristics, such as experience, gender and education. As an
example, a diﬀerence of one year on average schooling in the Portuguese counties,
is associated with an individual wage gap of 8.4%, similar to the one found for
the U.S. case1. However, this association does not imply the idea that the
relationship represents a causal eﬀect or just reflects that more able workers
choose to work in better-educated cities, for example. Changes in average local
education levels may also raise wages less than the private returns to schooling if
education is a complement of some inelastically supplied factor of production, or
if schooling has a signaling value. Nevertheless, most of the theoretical literature
1Acemoglu and Angrist’s (2001) OLS results, using data from 1950 to 1990, leads to an
estimate of 7.2%, controlling for state of residence main eﬀects, and between 12.8% and 16.8%
without state of residence controls.
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on this issue lays on the assumption that the social value of education exceed
the private return, through human capital externalities from a more educated
labor force2.
New growth theory often states that externalities that arise from education
are one of the key elements of the economic growth and on the spatial agglom-
eration of production. According to Lucas (1988), human capital externalities
in cities are viewed as a key determinant of the development of nations. Other
economists have also recognize that social returns to education may diﬀer from
the private ones. As an example, Marshall (1890) argued that social interactions
among workers of the same industry enhance their productivity.
The role of the firm might also be considered. Externalities from education
may arise if human and physical capital are complementary factors of produc-
tion, and if firms choose their physical capital in anticipation of the average
human capital of the workers they will employ in the future3. In this case,
firms that use more intensively physical capital will be attracted to cities where
labor force is more educated. Therefore, if matching is random and breaking
the match is costly, equilibrium wages will increase with the average education
of the workforce. Some workers who have not increased their education will
work with more physical capital and earn more than the same type of workers
in locations with lower human capital levels. On the other hand, is possible
that workers learn from each other in their place of work. Hence, workers in
firms with higher average level of education will earn more not only because they
work with more physical capital, but also because they become more productive,
through interactions with other co-workers.
2 e.g. Rauch (1993).
3For a formal model, see Acemoglu (1996).
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However, despite the substantial theoretical literature and the importance
of this issue for economic policy, much less is known about the empirical rele-
vance of the social returns to education than the private returns. One possible
explanation for this, is the diﬃculty of the study of market-level externalities
relative to the study of individual-level private returns. In fact, the problem
of identification related to the estimation of social returns is more accurate,
than the one that arise from the estimation of the private returns. The possible
endogeneity of both regressors, individual education and average education4,
implies that the observed association between schooling variables and wages is
not necessarily causal. In fact, with worker mobility, and if there is a local public
benefit from private knowledge, there is also an incentive for sorting of higher
ability workers, leading to regional variations of individual wages, even if ob-
servable characteristics of the workers are controlled for. Therefore, the positive
association between individual wages and local average education possibly not
only include the education externalities but also reflects that more able workers
choose to live in more educated cities. If the association between local average
education and individual wages is only due to sorting of high ability workers,
than the social return to education estimated by a fixed eﬀects model should be
zero, considering that individual ability is time invariant.
Another identification problem is related with the possibility that workers
with diﬀerent levels of education are imperfect substitutes in production (e.g.
Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998), Card and Lemieux (2000)). Increasing the
aggregate supply of highly educated workers will increase wages of workers with
low levels of education and decrease wages of workers with high levels of edu-
4 In Rauch (1993), average education is treated as exogenous.
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cation, even if wages reflect their marginal social products. A recent paper of
Ciccone and Peri (2002) proposes an approach to the identification of human
capital externalities at the aggregate level whether workers with diﬀerent human
capital are imperfect substitutes in production. Nevertheless, under the capital-
skill complementarity hypothesis, the problems of estimation of the externality
under imperfect substitution are not so severe, because unskilled labor is more
substitutable by physical capital than skilled labor.
Despite of the absence of experimental evidence, some of the few available
studies of market-level education externalities used some ideas that underlie the
quasi-experimental studies of the private return to education. As an example,
Acemoglu and Angrist (2001), use instruments for average schooling derived
from compulsory attendance laws and child labor laws in states of birth. They
found a small social return to education (less than 1%, not significantly diﬀerent
from zero), which is also consistent with the Ciccone and Peri’s results. In
contrast, Moretti (2002) instruments for average schooling with the lagged city
demographic structure and the presence of land-grant college, and found that
an increase of 1% share of college graduates raises individual wages in the range
between 1.9% and 0.4%, according to diﬀerent individual education status5.
In this paper we want to assess how strong are the externalities that arise
from education, using longitudinal individual data for the years 1989 to 1999.
This data provides information about both employers and workers by location.
The data is taken from the “Quadros de Pessoal” of the Portuguese Ministry
of Labor and Solidarity, which collects information on all companies operat-
5The diﬀerence between instruments can be one explanation for diﬀerent results found by
these studies. While Moretti’s instruments induce more variation in College attendance, the
instruments used by Acemoglu and Angrist aﬀect mainly high school drop-outs.
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ing in Portugal. With this dataset, it is possible not only to control for the
observable characteristics of the firm, namely the eﬀect of the general level of
education within the firm on the individual’s productivity, but also to take into
account individual fixed eﬀects, in order to control for time invariant individual
characteristics. At this stage we will use panel data about exogenously dis-
placed workers, who lost their jobs because of firms closings. This information
is needed not only because we get more variation on the variables of interest,
since displaced workers are more likely to move, but also because this geograph-
ical mobility after displacement is more likely to be exogenous. We then test
the hypothesis that education externalities probably do not benefit all work-
ers equally, but accordingly to their education level. This information about
displaced workers will also be used to check if the human capital externalities
are captured immediately, or only over time, in other words, whether movers
to locations with higher average education levels enjoy faster wage growth than
those who stay.
Our empirical results, controlling first for city fixed eﬀects, do not indicate
a significative social return to education. These results are even stronger if firm
characteristics are accounted for. This small eﬀect is consistent with the more
recent empirical works on this subject. Nevertheless, it seems that the ability to
capture this externality diﬀers depending on the type of worker. Using a sample
of displaced workers, after 5 years of being displaced, the wages of a college
graduate increase by more than 3%, relative to a worker with basic education
if both observe a change in the average education of their county by one year.
This result is robust to the inclusion of some mobility controls, and do not diﬀer
between sub-samples of movers and stayers. On the other hand, there is some
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evidence that returns to tenure tend to increase with average city education,
which is a sign that this kind of externalities are not acquired immediatly, but
along time.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a series of possible
explanations for the influence of local human capital on wages, and sets out the
main features that will be examined in the empirical work. Section 3 describes
the data and the estimation strategy, Section 4 presents the results and, finally,
Section 5 concludes.
2 Human Capital Externalities: Theoretical and
Measurement Framework
2.1 A simple model
Consider a city c that produces a single commodity Yc, the price of which is
normalized to one. This output is produced in a competitive economy and
traded on the national market. There are Lc workers in the city, and the single
production input is labor. The aggregate production function for each city takes
the following form:
Yc = Ac
· LcP
i=1
hi
¸
, (1)
where hi is the worker’s i human capital. Therefore, the output per worker is:
yic = Achi, (2)
which is equal to his gross earnings, wic = Achi.
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Ac is the productivity shifter, and we allow to depend on a measure of
aggregate human capital Hc. The motivation for this modelization is based on
the Lucas’s (1988) argument that human capital has important external returns.
These externalities arise through the exchange of ideas, imitation, or learning
by doing. We will refer to these external eﬀects as technological or interaction
externalities, because these eﬀects work not through prices, but directly through
the production function. As in Lucas (1988), the measure of aggregate human
capital is the average human capital in the city, Hc = E [hi] = hc, and hence:
Ac = Dch
θ
c . (3)
In this set up, human capital externalities are captured by the elasticity θ
and Dc measures a city fixed eﬀect. Therefore, individual earnings are:
wic = Achi = Dch
θ
chi, (4)
and taking logs, we have:
logwic = logDc + θ log hc + log hi. (5)
With this formulation, in order to estimate θ we need data on individual
human capital, wages and on some measure of hc, for each city.
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2.2 Considering individual heterogeneity on human capi-
tal supply
A more realistic model would have to assume some heterogeneity in individual
characteristics. We now consider that individuals are heterogeneous in terms
of their unobserved ability ηi = αiη(si), which depends on an individual char-
acteristic αi, and also, potentially, on schooling. Suppose that their human
capital can be expressed as a function of their individual schooling and ability:
hi = exp(βηηi+βssi), where βη and βs are the returns to ability and education,
respectively.
Consider that the cost function of acquiring si of education is 12qis2i , where
qi is the cost of education, or, as in Card (1995), the personal discount rate for
individual i.
The optimal level of individual schooling is chosen by each individual by
maximizing the following function:
U(Cic, si) = logCic −
1
2
qis2i , (6)
where Cic is the worker’s i consumption in city c.
Assume, also, that workers supply their human capital inelastically, and
having acquired it instantaneously at the beginning of their single-period life.
They borrow the requisite funds to support the cost of education at a zero
interest rate, and there are no savings. Therefore, Cic = wic, and logCic =
logwic = logDc + θ log hc + βηηi + βssi. The equilibrium schooling s∗ levels
satisfies:
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βηαiη0(s∗i ) + βs = qis∗i . (7)
As long as ηi or qi diﬀers across workers, the optimal schooling levels will also
potentially be diﬀerent. For example, suppose that η0(si) > 0, and η00(si) < 0,
which means that individual ability increases with education at a decreasing
rate. Individuals with more αi or facing lower qi, tend to get more schooling.
City average human capital can be approximated to average schooling, as-
suming that log hc = logEc [hi] ≈ c0 + c1Ec [log hi] and c0 + c1Ec [log hi] =
c0+ c1Ec
£
βηηi + βssi
¤
= c0+ c1βηEc [ηi]+ c1βsEc [si] .With θc1βηEc [η(si)] =
γηηc, defined as the city average ability, γη the external return to average abil-
ity, and θc1βs = γS , estimation of the schooling externalities can be based on
the following equation:
logwic = γ0 + logDc + γηηc + γSSc + βηηi + βssi + uic, (8)
where Sc = Ec [si] is the average schooling in city c, and uic is the individual
error term. The main problem to estimate the parameter of interest γS , is the
possibility of correlation between either ηc and Sc si, or ηi and Sc or si, because
average and individual ability are not directly observed. This correlation arises
from the endogenous schooling decision process. However if individual schooling
and individual ability are both time invariant, a model with individual fixed
eﬀects could solve the endogeneity problem caused by these regressors. But, we
still have the problem on the OLS estimation if there is any correlation between
changes on average ability and changes on average education, even if we take
into account city fixed eﬀects. One possible source of this correlation arises if
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the benefits of the interaction process is not only linked with the education of
the workforce but also on its average skills, which means that γη is not zero.
If this correlation is positive, then OLS overestimates the true externality γS ,
and the estimated result includes the externality that arises from the interaction
with other components of the average human capital.
The other possible source of endogeneity, related with the possible corre-
lation between average ability and average education, concerns the worker’s
location decisions. If more able workers choose cities with more educated labor
force, than the association between average education and individual wages is
not necessarily causal. On the other hand, we have to insure an equilibrium in
which workers must be indiﬀerent between living in diﬀerent cities.
2.3 Considering city heterogeneity on human capital sup-
ply and demand
Consider now the local public goods model of Roback (1982). This model as-
sumes that households and firms are freely mobile between cities (no transporta-
tion costs), and there are no inter-city commuting. In equilibrium, the relevant
utility acquired by workers must be identical across cities Uic(wci(Hc), zc, rc) =
Uik(wki(Hk), zk, rk), where c and k denote city, w.i denote wages, r.i rents and
z.i are vectors of all characteristics of cities that are relevant for utility U , such
as degree of pollution or quality of the public goods.
Firms combine capital, local labor and local land to produce the tradable
single commodity. The price of capital is set in international capital mar-
kets and therefore is equal across locations as the price of the commodity, as
before. Production technology is C.R.S. in all production inputs, and loca-
11
tion characteristics enter in production as Hicks-neutral shift parameters (as
the parameter Dc in the above framework). Spatial equilibrium then requires
c(wc(Hc), zc, rc) = c(wk(Hk), zck, rk) = 1, where c is the unit cost of production,
normalized to one, for simplicity.
Suppose an increase in z (a shock in local conditions) in city c that increases
individual utility mainly for more skilled workers and also their own productiv-
ity. Then, as more skilled workers are attracted to the city, rents will increase,
because land is supplied inelastically, and lower skilled workers would move to
other city. Therefore we will observe positive correlation between average wages
and average education, even without human capital externalities. This fact im-
plies that some local demand variables must be added in order to control for
these shocks.
Note that in this set-up, the diﬀerences in living standards are not relevant
for individual wage determination. Firms producing traded goods face the same
prices and have to receive the same rate of return to physical capital, and
therefore they must have a more productive workforce in high wage cities. Only
firms producing nontraded goods may care about local prices.
2.4 Considering firm heterogeneity
So far, all the works on this subject do not consider firm heterogeneity, but
we also should take into account the hypothesis of sorting of heterogeneous
firms across space. For example, firms diﬀer in terms of their wage policies, for
example, rewarding diﬀerently the human capital of their workers. It is hard
to believe on the assumption that the labor market is perfectly competitive.
Therefore, we should accept that exists diﬀerent mechanisms of wage bargaining,
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across sectors or firms. Hence, if there are sectors in which workers are more
capable to gain a larger share of the economic rents, then these sectors will
show a positive wage premium not related with productivity. In our framework,
if these kind of sectors (e.g. banking or transports) are located mainly in high
educated cities, than diﬀerences in wages across space are not only due to human
capital externalities, but also are associated with spatial sorting of sectors with
diﬀerent wage policies. Even within sectors it is also plausible that firm’s wage
policies can diﬀer between them. If more educated workers are possibly more
able to bargain and to capture a large share of the economic rents, then the
average human capital of the firm should be also correlated with the individual’s
wage. Also, it is natural that part of the interaction spillovers are not captured
outside the firm, but within firm. As workers with diﬀerent skills interact during
the production process, they exchange relevant information between themselves,
and therefore a significant part of the city externalities are in fact firm specific,
and cannot be considered as externalities.
Hence, in our model, we could consider that Ac, the productivity shifter,
depends also on the firm’s characteristics Zj :
Acj = DcZδj h
θ
c . (9)
With this formulation, it is easy to see that we have to add the term δ logZj
to our wage equation.
Note that controlling for firm characteristics also allow us to focus on in-
teraction (technological) externalities, rather than pecuniary externalities, as in
the Acemoglu’s (1996) model. Even if firms choose more capital in locations
with more human capital, we expect to capture this with our control variables.
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2.5 Considering imperfect input substitution
So far, we have been considering that workers with diﬀerent levels of human cap-
ital are perfect substitutes. However, with imperfect substitution, the produc-
tivity of low skilled workers will increase, as the share of high skilled increases,
even in the absence of any externality (see, for example Ciccone and Peri, 2002).
On the other hand, the impact of the increase in the share of better educated
workers on their own wage is determined by two competing forces: the first is
the conventional eﬀect which makes the economy move along a downward slop-
ing demand curve, while the second is the externality that raises productivity.
To illustrate this, lets consider now a variation of the first model, where we in-
clude two types of labor. The product Yc of the city c is produced under a CES
production function that combines to types of labor: skilled Hc and unskilled
Lc:
Yc = Ac [Lρc +Hρc ]
1/ρ , (10)
where ρ < 1 if L andH are imperfect substitutes, or ρ = 1 if L andH are perfect
substitutes. The elasticity of substitution between labor and human capital is
given by σ = 1/(1− ρ).
Assuming that Ac is a productivity shifter, and, as before, we let to depend
on the average level of human capital hc = H/L, and on a constant exogenous
city specific factor Dc:
Ac = Dch
θ
c , (11)
Assuming that the price of labor wL and the price of human capital wH are
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equal to their marginal products, and firms take Ac as given, we have:
wLc =
∂Yc
∂Lc
= Ac
h
1 + hρc
i( 1−ρρ ) , (12)
and
wHc =
∂Yc
∂Hc
= Ac
h
h−ρc + 1
i( 1−ρρ ) . (13)
Now we can analyze the elasticity of the average human capital hc on the
above prices:
∈L=
∂ lnwLc
∂ lnhc
= (1− ρ)ΠH + θ, (14)
where ΠH = h
(θH+1)ρ
hθHρ+h(θH+1)ρ is the share of human capital in total labor costs.
This expression shows that the elasticity ∈Lof the average human capital on the
price of labor is always positive (assuming non-negative externalities and ρ < 1).
Even with θ = 0, the elasticity is positive under imperfect substitution between
labor and human capital: an increase in human capital implies an increase in the
marginal productivity of the raw labor, increasing its price. Only with perfect
substitution (ρ = 1), ∈L is equal to the externality θ.
Consider, now the elasticity of the average human capital h on the price of
human capital:
∈H=
∂ lnwH
∂ lnh = − (1− ρ) (1−ΠH) + θ.
This means that the net eﬀect of an increase in average human capital in
the price of human capital will be positive only if the strength of the externality
θ is larger than the negative eﬀect − (1− ρ) (1−ΠH) , the conventional supply
eﬀect which makes the economy move along a downward sloping demand curve.
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If imperfect substitution of diﬀerent worker types is relevant, than we only
can infer the existence of an externality if the increase in average education is
related with an increase of the wage of the better educated workers. Therefore,
we have to compare the size of the coeﬃcient associated with average education
across diﬀerent education groups in order to shed some light on the size of the
spillover.
2.5.1 A possible extension: considering the capital-skill complemen-
tarity hypothesis
The above framework shows the standard results found in the literature concern-
ing the identification of human capital externalities at the city level. However,
these literature (e.g. Ciccone and Peri, 2002; Acemoglu and Angrist, 2001;
Moretti, 2002), consider that the elasticity of substitution between capital and
unskilled labor is the same as the one between capital and skilled labor or hu-
man capital. This is a strong assumption since the estimates of substitution
elasticities between capital and skilled labor are consistent with capital-skill
complementarity hypothesis, which means that the elasticity of substitution be-
tween capital and unskilled labor is higher that between capital and skilled labor
(see Krusell, Ohanian, Ríos-Rull, and Violante, 2000).
This hypothesis of capital-skill complementarity is formalized by Griliches
(1969), and we can illustrate this in our framework with a very simple model.
Consider that output in city c is produced with capital Kc, human capital Hc
and raw (unskilled) labor Lc, as before. Capital and raw labor are perfect
substitutes and have unit elasticity of substitution with human capital:
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Yc = (AcHc)α(AcL+K)1−α. (15)
The marginal productivity of capital is equal to its price pK and is:
pK =
∂Y
∂K = (1− α)
µ
AcH
AcL+K
¶α
. (16)
If the price of capital is the same in all country, and normalized to (1 − α),
therefore:
pK = (1− α)⇔
µ
AcH
(AcL) +K
¶α
= 1⇔ (17)
K = AcH −AcL, with α 6= 0. (18)
Therefore, the prices of labor and human capital are (and considering Ac
defined as before):
wL = ∂Y∂L = (1− α)Ac, and (19)
wH = ∂Y∂H = αAc.
The price of labor is identical to the price of capital times the productivity
shifter Ac. It is straightforward to calculate the elasticities ∈L and ∈H :
∈L=
∂ lnwL
∂ lnh = θ, and (20)
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∈H=
∂ lnwH
∂ lnh = θ. (21)
This is an interesting result: even with imperfect substitution between L
and H we can obtain elasticities ∈L and ∈H similar to the ones under perfect
substitution, if labor is perfectly substitutable by capital. Therefore, and as-
suming the capital-skill complementarity hypothesis, we can assume a range of
variation for ∈L and for ∈H :
θ <∈L< (1− ρ)ΠH + θ (22)
and
− (1− ρ) (1−ΠH) + θ <∈H< θ. (23)
This result means that an estimate of∈Lmay overstates the true value of θ, while
an estimate of ∈H can be thought as a lower bound of the true value θ.
3 Econometric Framework
3.1 General Discussion
As we quoted before, the main identification problem of the education exter-
nalities, in an equation like (8) is the omitted-variables bias that arise from
the correlation between average schooling and individual or average ability, and
other city-year eﬀects embodied in the error component. Individual ability can
be controlled in a first diﬀerences estimation strategy, using individual data,
but we still have a problem of identification if individual ability is remunerated
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diﬀerently across locations or across time, which means that the parameter βη
in equation (8) might be written as βηct. However, we try to mitigate this bias
using a displaced workers sample, in order to reduce this bias, because the choice
of the location to work after displacement is more likely to be exogenous than
the one in the sample of all population. Also, once we control for some firm
characteristics we are ruling out diﬀerences in the ability premium that are firm
specific, and (potentially) change over time. A similar problem holds if varia-
tions in city average ability are correlated with changes in average education,
and if average ability has some role in the individual wage setting. In this case
our estimate of the educational externality we will be biased up.
Another source of bias is the measurement error in individual education. If
grouping (averaging across all individuals within a city) corrects for attenuation
bias due to measurement error in si, that the coeﬃcient associated with aver-
age education will be biased up (see Acemoglu and Angrist, 2001, for a formal
proof). The opposite holds if grouping eliminates correlation between si and un-
observed ability. Also, we have to take into account the measurement error bias
induced by the measurement of the variable average education due to the fact
that we are only observing full time workers in the private sector of the economy.
Note that we can not identify employees on the public administration, as well
as unemployed workers. Suppose, for example, that the average education of
employees in Public Administration is higher than the average education of the
workers in private sector, and the share of public jobs, is higher in cities with
low educational standards. Therefore our estimate of the coeﬃcient associated
with the local average education will be biased up (or down if the opposite is
true).
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The other source of omitted-variables bias is related with local demand or
supply shocks in the labor market. Suppose that economic growth is faster in
cities with higher average education, then we will observe an increase in wages
in those cities not related not motivated by education externalities. Having this
in mind, we try to control for these local shocks by including two additional
variables (in addition to the city dummy): the (log of) city employment and the
(log of) per capita value of the city gross production (which the summation of
the sales of all firms located in the city, divided by the number of workers). A
positive shock on the local demand conditions will cause an increase in the city
labor force, or, alternatively, an increase in the per capita gross product, if the
labor supply does not react to this shock.
The usual way to deal with this identification problem is to follow an IV
strategy. However, a good instrument that provides an exogenous variation in
the average education on all distribution of skills is required. So far, the instru-
ments used are basically two: changes in compulsory schooling laws (Acemoglu
and Angrist, 2001) and city demographic structure (Moretti, 20026, and Ciccone
and Peri, 2002). The first instrument aﬀects mainly educational attainment in
the lower part of the distribution, mostly in middle or high school dropouts,
while the variations motivated by the second instrument are related with the
presence of young cohorts of workers in the city labor force. Only by chance
we can expect that the external eﬀect induced by one year average education
increase in a city, motivated mainly by those who finish high school or by young
6Moretti (2002) also used the presence of a land-grant college as an instrumental variable.
However this instrument cannot be used in a specification that includes city fixed eﬀects, be-
cause it would be absorbed by the fixed eﬀect. In our case, as we show next, the consideration
of city fixed eﬀects is crucial in this set-up, because these eﬀects explain the major part of the
association between average education and individual wages.
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highly educated workers, has the same impact on individual productivity as a
similar increase obtained by a rise in college graduates with some labor experi-
ence. The other way to induce exogenous variation in the worker’s educational
environment is not to look for changes in the environment itself, but consider
quasi-exogenous mobility of the workers, and that is what we intend to do in
the second part of the estimation strategy.
3.2 Estimation Strategy
Our estimation strategy will be the following: first we will estimate versions of
the basic mincerian wage equation on all workers’ sample (pooled cross-sections
from diﬀerent years), adding information about the relevant characteristics of
the worker’s location. The second step will be to regress the wage equations but
now on the displaced workers’ sample. Estimating the equations in first diﬀer-
ences, we can control for individual fixed eﬀects. The use of the displaced work-
ers sample provides much more variation in the independent variable average
county education as well as in the average firm education variable because
the share of movers is much more accurate than in the original dataset. On
the other hand, these movements are also less endogenous than the movements
that we observe in the original dataset. The last step will be to check which
sub-groups of workers, in terms of their education, are more able to capture the
education externalities, and test the learning hypothesis, namely that the wage
of the workers in a more educated location will grow faster than the others.
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3.2.1 Estimation procedure using the pooled cross-sectional data
The main problem with the pooled data is related with the sample dimension,
which is computationally onerous. Therefore, a two step estimation procedure
will be considered. This strategy requires a first stage, where a regression-
adjusted mean wage in city c at time t, λct, is obtained from the following
regression (runned for each year):
logwijct = λct +Xitβ + Zjtδ +
5X
r=1
Rirt + εijct, (24)
where logwijct is the log of the hourly wage of the individual i, who works
in the firm j in county c, observed at time t. Xit is a vector of individual
characteristics (gender, (potential) experience and years of schooling), Zjt is a
vector of the observable characteristics of the worker’s firm j and Rrt are region-
year dummy variables that have a value of one if the establishment where the
worker is employed is located in region r, in year t. β and δ are the vectors of
associated coeﬃcients. λct is a set of city-time dummies that can be interpreted
as a vector of adjusted city average wages.
In the second stage, we treat the resulting panel of 1650 (275 cities ×6 years)
bλct and estimate longitudinal regressions with the following specification:
bλct = γSSct + ςLLct + ςV Vct + 5X
r=1
6X
t=1
Rcrt + φc + uct. (25)
Sct is the average education level in the city c at time t. γS is the externality
related with average education and φc is the parameter that captures the eﬀects
of time invariant unobserved city characteristics not time variant. Note that
φc can not vary over, otherwise we can not identify the γS . Therefore, and in
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order to account for local demand shocks on economic activity, we also include
a set of region-year fixed eﬀects and two other time varying variables, the (log
of) city employment in private sector Lct and the (log of) city average sales per
worker Vct. Finally, uct, is the error term. As pointed by Card and Krueger
(1996), this two step estimating strategy is asymptotically unbiased and eﬃcient
if proper GLS weights are used in the second stage. Therefore, estimation is by
weighted least squares, where the weights used are number of observations per
city to account for diﬀerences in the precision of the first stage estimates, and
White-corrected standard errors are requested.
3.2.2 Estimation procedure using the displaced workers sample
Other important source of omitted variables is individual unobserved hetero-
geneity. In fact, if better workers may be attracted to cities with high human
capital, then individual ability will be positively correlated with average educa-
tion. This correlation can arise because workers are not randomly assigned to
cities, but tend to choose the city where their skills are most valued. However,
we would not have this problem if we based our estimation on a group of work-
ers that were exogenously removed from their jobs and them randomly assigned
to new firms. Some workers were assigned to firms in their original city, while
others were assigned to firms in other cities. Therefore, individual and average
city ability would not be correlated with average education and we could obtain
an unbiased estimate of the externality, using a simple OLS approach.
Unfortunately, we do not have data on such experiment, but we can select
a group of workers that were displaced and who lost their jobs because of es-
tablishment closings. Remark that this sample is not completely random if the
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probability of being displaced by an establishment closing diﬀer across cities
and is correlated with city average education. Also, movers may have diﬀerent
characteristics of the stayers, and the location choice before and after displace-
ment is not, obviously, completely exogenous, because workers tend to choose
cities that have higher returns to their skills.7
In light of these limitations, we adopt the following approach. We regress a
base mincerian wage equation in first diﬀerences, which remove individual fixed
eﬀects and other time invariant variables (such as gender or age). With city fixed
eﬀects, we can control for (time-invariant) individual and city heterogeneity:
∆ logwijc = γS∆Sc +∆Xiβ +∆Zjλ+ (φtc − φ(t−τ)c) + (26)
5X
r=1
6X
t=1
(Rirt −Rir(t−τ)) + ςL∆Lc + ςV∆Vc +∆ε.
We also impose a time-variant coeﬃcient to individual education (βSt), and
a dummy variable equal to one if the worker changed the city of work, in or-
der to control for any mobility premium. This regression is runned first with
predisplacement and two years after displacement data, and secondly with pre-
displacement and five years after displacement data. These regressions are also
runned separately for stayers and movers.
With this data we also intend to distinguish between the eﬀect of local av-
erage education on the wage level or on the wage growth. In fact, it is possible
that the benefits of interacting in a better educated environment do not appear
immediately, but only over time. Higher local education may facilitate coor-
7For a similar procedure see Gibbons and Katz (1992) or Neal (1995) on the estimation of
industry-specific human capital.
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dination and allow individuals to specialize, making easier for workers to find
the best jobs for themselves. Also, an educated labor force might the speed the
rate of interactions with high-skill individuals who can be imitated or the rate
at which agents have new experiences (see Glaeser, 1999, for a formalization).
This growth wage eﬀect will be tested using an interaction term between tenure
and average city education. If the returns to tenure after displacement increase
with average education, then we can infer that, presumably, there are some pro-
ductive skills that are acquired over time, and are related with the educational
environment.
3.3 Data Description
The dataset used in this paper was constructed from the Quadros de Pessoal,
of the Ministry of Labor and Solidarity (MTS). Beginning in 1982 and on a
yearly basis, this Ministry has been collecting information on all companies op-
erating in Portugal, except family businesses without wage-earning employees,
through a mandatory questionnaire. Reported data match the firm, the estab-
lishment and each of the workers, and include the worker’s gender, age, skill,
occupation, schooling, tenure and earnings as well as the firm’s location, indus-
try employment level, sales volume and legal setting. The existence of a unique
identification number (social security number) for the workers and firms enables
the construction of a panel of workers (although we only use a panel of workers
in the second set of regressions). Since the data includes detailed information
on plant location at the city (“concelho”) level8, it is possible to retain vari-
ables not only to characterize workers and firms, but also to characterize their
8 “Concelho” is a fairly small administrative area, with an average area of 322 km2. Between
1989 and 1998 the total number of “concelhos” in the continental part of Portugal was 275.
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location.
From the original dataset, we selected the observations on the following
basis: first we dropped part-time workers as well as workers that did not work
the normal period in the month of the survey (about 22% of whole dataset).
Recall that the information on social security numbers is not validated because is
not used for the production of oﬃcial statistics and consequently there are some
coding error and missing observations. Therefore, we dropped all observations
without a valid identification number (3 to 7%, depending on the year) and
dropped all individuals whose identification number appear twice or more, after
keeping the full-time workers. This is a suspicion of a typo or a mistake when
the data was introduced, but also could be the case that some individuals have
more than one full time job. Note that if some workers have a full-time job and
a part-time one, than the information related with the later job is deleted, while
we maintained the former.
Then, we excluded all the observations for which one of the variables used
in our analysis is missing, such as education level or date of birth and then we
retained only the workers in firms with more than six employees, non agriculture
or fishery, and located in the continental part of Portugal. From each year we
selected randomly 20% of this “cleaned” dataset, due to computing capacity.
Our final dataset is summary described in Table 1. which shows the average
hourly wages as well as the (weighted) average city education, before and after
data selection.
[Table 1 here]
The average nominal yearly nominal wages in our final dataset are higher
(roughly 4%) than the ones observed in the original dataset. This is not sur-
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prising because we drop workers from typically low paid jobs, as agriculture or
part-time workers. However, we only observe small increase of about 1% in the
mean of average city education variable, which is a signal that the selection of
observations did not change their distribution across space.
In order to reduce the endogeneity of movement decision we considered a
sample of displaced workers, who lost their jobs because of firms closings in 1993
and 19949. Nevertheless, displaced workers after displacement tend to earn less
than the average of the original sample of workers, which can be related with
the fact that displaced workers have lower education than the overall average.
However while the first sub-sample (displaced workers in 1992) shows lower
wages than average, the second sub-sample has higher nominal hourly wages
than average. Table 2 compares some variables of both samples, in 1992 (before
displacement) and 1995 (after displacement).
[Table 2 here]
Note that from the sample of displaced workers in 1992 (46,440 workers)
and from the one in 1993 (103,653 workers) we only found 13,699 in the 1995
records and 19,949 in the 1996 records, respectively. Two possible explanations
for this: the first one is the possibility that some workers choosed to retire after
the displacement (this is consistent with the data concerning the average age of
this sample); the second explanation lays in the fact that other workers could
be either self-employed or unemployed in 1995 or 1996, or in other case, they
found a job in public admistration.
9We assumed that we observe a firm closing if the identification number of one firm ap-
peared in 1992 but did not appear in 1993, or appear in 1993 and did not in 1994. However, it
is possible that some firms changed the identification number due to mergers or splits. There-
fore, we droped all workers for whom the date of admission (observed in 1995 and 1998, from
the 1992 sample; and observed in 1996 and 1999, from the 1993 sample) was before 1992 or
1993 (about 1/3 of the sample).
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3.4 Wage Determination and Dispersion in the Portuguese
Labor Market
Portugal is one of the OECD economies with the highest degrees of wage flexi-
bility and responsiveness of wages to the macro unemployment rate (see OECD,
1992 or Modesto and Monteiro, 1993). However, the intermediate nature of cen-
tralization in the Portuguese wage bargaining system does not allow any clear
answer about wage adjustment at the micro level. In fact, some guidelines for
wage increases are set at the central level by the government, unions and em-
ployers’ associations. On the other hand, it is possible to bargain at the firm or
sectorial level due to the scattered nature of the union structure. This means
that collective bargaining is extensively applied, setting minimum wage levels
for diﬀerent categories of workers. Therefore, the use of information about the
firms’ characteristics and worker’s occupation is crucial in our subject.
Nevertheless, wage drift has been increasing in the Portuguese economy,
especially for highly skilled and white-collar workers. According to Cardoso
(2000), wage dispersion across firms is particularly pronounced for workers with
high levels of schooling and for those with high tenure, while experience is
valued in a more uniform way. This fact will be particularly important if there
are diﬀerences between the type of worker in terms of his ability to capture the
human capital externalities: the wage response to local education externalities
will be more clear for workers with more schooling.
In terms of the inequality observed at wage level, Portugal has an inequality
pattern close to that of the UK, which has been increasing over the last two
decades (Cardoso, 1998). This increase of inequality is related mainly to a
rise in the premium to higher education and in more complex jobs, while the
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premium related to tenure has been falling.
The spatial wage dispersion has been less studied than the dispersion ob-
served at sectorial or firm level. However, some authors (see e.g. Vieira, Hartog
and Pereira (1997)) argue that earnings diﬀer significantly across regions, even
when other characteristics of the firms or workers are controlled for.
From the Table 11 (in Data Appendix) we can infer that the dispersion of
both a county’s average hourly wage and county employment have been de-
creasing, in spite of their large range of variation. However, average education
remains at a very low levels, comparing with other European countries’ educa-
tion level10, even if it increased 1.25 years during this period (see Table 8 in
Data Appendix).
3.5 The Variables of Interest
The Data Appendix gives us detailed information about all the variables. The
wage variable that we used was the log of hourly earnings, where earnings were
defined as the summation of all regular wage components. Earnings and labor
time were measured in the months of March (from 1989 to 1993) and October
(from 1994 to 1999). This variable is not deflated by the consumer price in-
dex because we will use region-time dummies in all our regressions in order to
eliminate both inflation and unrelated regional business cycle eﬀects.
The information about the education of the workers was given in levels, so
we converted it to the correspondent years of schooling. To compute the average
schooling at the firm level and at the county level, we exclude the worker’s own
10The share of the labor force with upper secondary or higher education, in 1992, was
55.8% in France and was 34,1% in Italy , while in Portugal was close to 25%. See OECD
(1994).
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education, in order to avoid multicolinearity problems. From the workers file we
extracted the variables gender, age, occupation and tenure. From the firms file
we used sector (we set 23 diﬀerent sectors), legal setting, equity capital share of
foreign owners and employment level. The location of the worker was computed
using the location of his establishment. We also include the a dummy for each
region (we consider 5 diﬀerent regions) and the (log of) city’s employment in
private sector, as well as the (log of) city’s sales per private employee. All the
variables were computed using the same dataset.
4 The Role of Local Average Education Capital
on Wages: Regressions and Results
4.1 Results based on the pooled cross-section data
The next table shows the regressions based on the pooled cross-section data,
using information on all full-time workers, in the private sector of the portuguese
economy. The estimated equation is (25), after regressing (24). From columns
(1) to (3) we do not include firm controls, in order to compare our results with
similar estimates of other works. Columns (4) to (6) include firm controls.
[Table 3 here]
Regression (0) shows that, if we compare two workers in locations in which
average schooling diﬀers by one year, the gap between their wages would be
about 18.4%, on average (we are only controlling for region-year eﬀects). When
we include individual characteristics (schooling, potential labor market experi-
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ence and gender), as in regression (1a) the coeﬃcient is now 8.4%11. Note that,
the change from 18.4% to less than one half (8.4%) is indicative that sorting
eﬀects are very important. It is implied in this fact that if there is sorting
on observables, sorting based on unobserved individual ability should also be
expected. This topic will be addressed latter.
The inclusion of city fixed eﬀects reduces the coeﬃcient associated with
average education to almost one quarter of the value found in regression (1a).
This means that a very significant part of the relationship between average
schooling and wages is due to omitted city characteristics. The inclusion of the
two controls for local demand shocks reduces further the estimate to 1.7%, as
we see in regression (3a).
When we add firm and job characteristics (regression (1b) and (3b)), the
coeﬃcient associated with average city education is reduced dramatically, first
to 2.4% (without city fixed eﬀects) and then becomes negative (although not
significant) if we consider the full equation, with controls for unobserved city
characteristics and local demand controls (regression (2b) and (3b)). These
results show that even the small value of 1.7% found in (3a) can not be inter-
preted as human capital externalities through local interactions, but is, in fact,
a function of the firm variables. This fact is particularly important because
other studies do not take these variables directly into account, particularly the
average education of the workers of the individual’s firm.
Should we infer that there is no external eﬀect of education on individual
11Acemoglu et al report an estimate of 16.8%, for the US economy in 1990, in a regression
that contains individual education, year-of-birth, and state-of-birth main eﬀects, for a sample
of white males aged 40-49. They report an estimate of 7.2% using 1950 and 1990 Census data,
when controll for state-of-residence main eﬀects. This estimate is not completely comparable
with ours, because we consider all full time workers (male, female and no age restriction) and
we do not include city-of-birth eﬀects.
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wages, if we use a complete set of controls? In fact some of these externalities
are captured by firm controls, while long term externalities are captured by
county dummies. That will be the case if the spillovers from education are not
captured by individuals immediately, but along their lives. On the other hand,
we are assuming that all individuals benefit in the same way from the existence
of knowledge spillovers, which can be a misleading simplification. In fact, we can
argue, not only that the process of acquiring knowledge is not instantaneous, but
also that the ability to absorb information is not the same across diﬀerent types
of individuals. This is the reason why we want next to focus on the subsample
of displaced workers.
4.2 Results based on the sample of displaced workers
Our objective, the estimation of the role of local human capital on the worker’s
wage, shares most of the identification problems that arise from the estimation
of the causal eﬀects of group interactions12. Consider, again, our basic wage
equation (8). Since we can not observe ηi, the individual specific eﬀect, given
the OLS properties we should consider the fixed eﬀect or a first diﬀerences
estimator, or alternatively, an IV estimator. With first diﬀerences estimation,
as in equation (26), we get unbiased estimates for the coeﬃcient of interest, if ηi
does not vary over time. However, self-selection biases can arise also in a fixed
eﬀects model if returns to ability change across firms or locations, and these
returns are correlated with average education of the city. On the other hand,
12See e.g. Manski (1993) about the problem of the identification of endogenous social eﬀects.
For interesting applications on inter-industry wage diﬀerentials see Krueger and Summers
(1988) or Gibbons and Katz (1992). See also Ichino and Maggi (2000) and Bertrand, Luttmer
and Mullainathan (2000) for applications of similar procedures.
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we only can identify γS if the average schooling levels of the worker’s city change
over time. If the worker does not move between cities, we are unlikely to observe
large changes in this variable. The analysis of displaced workers is needed not
only because we get more variation on the city features (since firm mobility is
associated with geographical mobility, in significant share of the cases)13 , but
also because mobility after displacement is more likely to exogenous.
The results presented above, in Table 3, showed that the impact of local
knowledge externalities on the workers’ wage seems quite small. However, as we
quoted above, we are assuming that all individuals benefit in the same way from
the existence of knowledge spillovers, which can be a misleading simplification.
If the ability to absorb information is not the same across diﬀerent types of in-
dividuals, we should take this into account in our econometric specification. We
can expect that more educated workers will benefit more from a more educated
environment than less educated ones, not only in the short run, but also in the
long run.
Table 4 represents the main results of a first diﬀerences estimation, adding
two more features, relative to the previous estimation. First we will estimate
two diﬀerent equations (one with observations on workers displaced in 1993 or
in 1994 and observed before displacement - 1992 or 1993 - and in three years
later and the other based on the same predisplacement sample but observed
six years later (in 1995 or 1996), and second we will consider the interactions
between the county’s average education and the individual’s education level.
[Table 4 here]
Although the interpretation of the results of the regressions without inter-
13 In our case, about 1/3 of displaced workers moved between counties in the period 1992-
1995, while the overall mobility rate is roughly 8% (consider all dataset) in the same period.
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actions follows the same rules as for a conventional fixed eﬀects estimation, the
equation with interactions should be interpreted more carefully. While there is
no significative diﬀerence between the coeﬃcient associated with local average
education by diﬀerent schooling levels in the equation with three years lag, we
found diﬀerent gains after 5 years of displacement, where higher educated work-
ers benefit more from a better-educated environment. An increase of one year
on local average education, raises high school and college graduate wages by 3%
more than the wage of an individual’s with basic schooling. Note that we are
considering a time-variant coeﬃcient to individual education (βSt), and dummy
variable equal to one if the worker changed the city of work, in order to include
some control for mobility premium.
For the moment we cannot conclude that more educated individuals are the
ones that benefit from an interaction externality, if individuals tend to choose
locations where their ability is better remunerated. This means that the returns
to ability may are location specific, and are correlated with local education. In
order to check whether there the positive result for the better educated workers
is due to an externality or due to sorting, we run the same type of regressions
as before, but now separately for movers and stayers. If the results do not diﬀer
significatively, we have to conclude that the externality may play some role on
the setting of the wage of better educated individuals. Table 5 shows the main
results.
[Table 5 here]
We found two interesting results: first there is no positive or significant
coeﬃcient on local average education for the equation with three years of lag,
either for stayers or movers. This is the first sign that mobility can be considered
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as exogenous, after the proper controls are used. Second, we confirm the result
showed in table 4: better-educated workers benefit more from a better educated
environment, only after a certain period of time, whether they are stayers or
movers.
So far we have some evidence that time combined with the educational level
of the city as some role on the acquisition of skills. This growth wage eﬀect
will be tested again, using an interaction term between tenure and average city
education. Tenure (in the post-displacement job) can be used as proxy for the
time that individual is exposed to some environmental conditions. If the returns
to tenure increase with average education, then we can infer that, presumably,
there are some productive skills that are acquired over time, and are related
with the educational environment.
[Table 6 here]
These results are interesting in the sense that returns to tenure are sensi-
tive to the worker’s environment, and to the worker’s type. As before, better
educated individuals benefit more from an increase in local education through
time (as tenure increases). For example, an increase of one year in the local
average education combined with five years tenure, provides a premium of 3.4%
(2.9%+5×0.001%=3.4%), as the same increase observed in an individual with
basic education and the same tenure after displacement.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we try to better understand the positive association between av-
erage local education and individual wages. Our dataset allows to control for
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the observable characteristics of the firm, namely to control for the eﬀect of the
general level of education within the firm on the individual’s productivity. as
well as to control for time invariant individual characteristics.
Our empirical results, controlling for individual fixed eﬀects, indicate that an
increase of one year in the average duration of schooling in Portuguese counties
has a small positive external eﬀect on individuals’ wages of 1.7%. However this
result flocks to zero if we add a set of firm controls. Therefore, pre-determined
characteristics of the worker’s location, and the spatial sorting of the firms can
explain almost all the association between average city education and individual
wages, holding the worker’s schooling constant. Also, this result is consistent
with the more recent empirical works on this subject.
However, it seems that the ability to capture this externality diﬀers depend-
ing on the type of worker. Using a sample of displaced workers, after 5 years
of being displaced, the wages of a college graduate increase by more than 3.0%,
relative to a worker with basic education if both observe a change in the average
education of their county by one year. This result is interesting because it is
robust to the imperfect substitution hypothesis. Under this, an estimate of the
externality related with local education on the wages of better-educated work-
ers must be understood as a lower bound of the true value, due to decreasing
returns to education. On the other hand, considering explicitly the mobility de-
cision does not change significantly the result. Also, adding an interaction term
between tenure and average education, provides more evidence that education
externalities may act mainly through learning.
Therefore we can not conclude that externalities from education do not exist.
In fact, there may be important externalities from schooling not reflected in
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higher wage rates for other. For example, many authors argue that education
has a social benefit from reducing crime rates or making citizens better voters.
On the other hand, if education externalities appear through the firm channel, it
would important to explore the role of human capital in the localization decision
of the firm. As more educated workers are attracted to locations where their
skills are better payed, as more high-tech industries would chosen such locations
in order to benefit from a pool of high skilled human capital. This can be true,
namely for industries where information is a key factor. Another possible path
to explore are the channels through which knowledge is transmitted, namely the
inter-industry versus intra-industry channels, and look at the eﬀects of intra-
industry and inter-industry externalities on employment and wages growth.
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A Tables
Table 1: Information extracted from the original dataset in 1989, 1991, 1993,
1995, 1997 and 1999
Year Original Dataset Final dataset
N r . o f o b s e r . N om . h o u r ly w a g e s A v . C i ty E d u c a t io n N r . o f o b s e r . N om . h o u r ly w a g e s A v . C i ty E d u c a t io n
1989 2.169.835 335.8 5.86 234.032 345,9 5.95
1991 2.233.237 485.1 6.19 247.800 506.6 6.25
1993 2.215.481 612.5 6.46 250.178 634.0 6.56
1995 2.232.548 698.4 6.75 267.020 730.4 6.82
1997 2.350.782 772.0 7.07 283.277 799.5 7.15
1999 2.568.456 885.4 7.43 293.391 917.3 7.51
T h e h o u r ly w a g e w a s d efi n e d a s t h e sum m a t io n o f a l l r e g u la r w a g e c om p o n e n t s d iv id e d by th e n o rm a l la b o r t im e .
E a rn in g s a n d la b o r t im e w e r e m e a s u r e d in th e m o n th o f M a rch ( in 1 9 8 9 , 1 9 9 1 a n d 1 9 9 3 ) a n d O c t o b e r ( 1 9 9 5 , 1 9 9 7 a n d 1 9 9 9 ) .
S o u r c e : P o r t u g u e s e M in i s t r y o f L a b o r a n d S o l id a r i ty, “Q u a d ro s d e P e s s o a l” D a t a s e t .
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Table 2: Comparison of both samples of workers
Year Number of Obs. Av. Nom. Hourly Wages Av. Worker Education
Variable (1a) (2a) (3a) (1b) (2b) (3b) (1c) (2c) (3c)
1992 2,268,151 46,440 - 563.6 422.4 - 6.35 5.66 -
(1.050) (355.1) (3.61) (2.90)
1993 2,215,481 - 103,653 611.3 - 707.1 6.55 - 6.73
(861.6) (591.7) (2.47) (3.78)
1995 2,232,548 13,699 - 696.3 552.0 - 6.80 6.35 -
(998.0) (477.8) (2.49) (3.08)
1996 2,233,721 - 19,940 737.5 631.5 6.95 - 6.66
(1,053.2) (631.2) (2.51) (3.32)
1998 2,430,691 16,104 - 845.0 711.5 - 7.32 6.61 -
(1,234.4) (657.4)) (2.65) (3.22)
1999 2,568,456 - 24,784 885.3 - 777.4 7.50 - 6.74
(1,260.4) (680.3) (2.80) (3.33)
C o lum n s ( 1 a ) , ( 1 b ) a n d ( 1 c ) r e f e r t o t h e o r ig in a l s am p le - a l l r e c o rd s .
C o lum n s ( 2 a ) , ( 2 b ) a n d ( 2 c ) r e f e r t o t h e d i sp la c e d w o rk e r s in 1 9 9 3 s u b - s am p le .
C o lum n s ( 3 a ) , ( 3 b ) a n d ( 3 c ) r e f e r t o t h e d i sp la c e d w o rk e r s in 1 9 9 4 s u b - s am p le .
S o u r c e : “Q u a d ro s d e P e s s o a l” D a t a s e t
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Table 3: Base Wage Regressions (Weighted Least Squares - all sample 1989-
1991-1993-1995-1997-1999)
Dep.Var: Log of Hourly Wage Regressions without Firm Controls
S im p le L ev e l E ﬀ e c t B a s e Wa g e E q . w / C ity F ix e d E ﬀ e c t s w / L o c a l D em an d C on t r o l s
(0) (1a) (2a) (3a)
Av. County Education
¡
Sct
¢
0.184*** 0.084*** 0.022*** 0.017***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.005)
Individual Characteristics (Xit) - Yes Yes Yes
City Fixed Eﬀects (φc) - - Yes Yes
Local Demand Controls Lc & Vc - - - Yes
R-Squared 0.9652 0.876 0.969 0.971
Regressions with Firm Controls
(1b) (2b) (3c)
Av. County Education
¡
Sct
¢
0.028*** -0.005 -0.009*
(0.002) (0.006) (0.005)
Individual Characteristics (Xit) Yes Yes Yes
City Fixed Eﬀects (φc) - Yes Yes
Local Demand Controls Lc & Vc - - Yes
R-Squared 0.810 0.950 0.954
N. Obs.1650 (275 cities ×6 years)
T h e d e p e n d e n t va r ia b le in c o lum n (0 ) i s t h e ave r a g e o f t h e in d iv id u a l lo g w a g e .
In c o lum n s ( 1 ) - ( 3 ) t h e d e p e n d e n t va r ia b le i s a r e g r e s s io n -a d ju s t e d m e a n w a g e in c i ty c a t t im e t, λct.
T h is a d ju s t e d m e a n is o b t a in e d r e g r e s s in g th e lo g o f h o u r ly e a rn in g s o n s om e in d iv id u a l ch a r a c t e r i s t ic s .
T h e s e a r e : g e n d e r , p o t e n t ia l e x p e r ie n c e a n d ye a r s o f s ch o o l in g ( in l e v e l s ) .
T h e d e p e n d e n t va r ia b le in c o lum n s ( 4 ) - ( 6 ) i s a r e g r e s s io n -a d ju s t e d m e a n o b t a in e d a s in c o lum n s ( 1 ) - ( 3 )
b u t a d d in g s om e fi rm a n d jo b q u a l i ty va r ia b le s T h e s e va r ia b le s a r e t e nu r e , o c c u p a t io n ,
s e c t o r ( 2 3 d iﬀ e r e n t s e c t o r s ) , l e g a l s e t t in g , e q u ity c a p it a l s h a r e o f f o r e ig n ow n e r s a n d em p loym en t le v e l .
W e c o n s id e r a l s o fi v e d iﬀ e r e n t r e g io n s , a n d w e in c lu d e in a l l r e g r e s s io n s r e g io n -y e a r d um m ie s .
R o b u s t s t a n d a rd e r r o r s , a d ju s t e d fo r in d iv id u a l s e r ia l c o r r e la t i o n , a r e r e p o r t e d in p a r e n th e s i s
w it h * r e p r e s e n t in g a s ig n ifi c a n c e le v e l low e r t h a n 1 0% , * * a s ig n ifi c a n c e l e v e l l ow e r t h a n 5%
a n d * * * a s ig n ifi c a n c e le v e l low e r t h a n 1% .
S o u r c e : P o r t u g u e s e M in is t r y o f L a b o r a n d S o l id a r i ty, “Q u a d ro s d e P e s s o a l” D a t a s e t .
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Table 4 - First Diﬀerences: Displaced Workers (1992 & 1993-1995 &1996
and 1992 & 1993 - 1998 & 1999)
Dep.Var: Dif.(Log of Hourly Wage) (1995 & 1996)-(1992 & 1993) (1998 & 1999)-(1992 & 1993)
t− (t− τ), τ = 3, 6 Wage Eq. without Wage Eq. w/ Wage Eq. without Wage Eq. w/
Firm Controls Firm Controls Firm Controls Firm Controls
Dif.(Av. County Education) -.013 -.034** 0.010 0.006
(0.017) (0.016) (0.013) (0.012)
Dif.(Av. Firm Education) - 0.012*** - 0.016***
(0.001) (0.001)
Interaction w/ Education
Dif.(Av. County Ed.) -0.016 -0.034** 0.000 0.001
(0.017) (0.016) (0.013) (0.012)
D i f . (A v . C o u n ty E d . )X H ig h S ch o o l & C o l le g e 0.015* -0.003 0.049*** 0.030***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
N. Obs. 49,198 Observations on 24,599 indiv. 60,164 Observations on 30,082 individ.
T h e lo g o f h o u r ly e a rn in g s w a s d efi n e d a s t h e s um m a t io n o f a l l r e g u la r w a g e c om p o n e n t s .
E a rn in g s a n d la b o r t im e w e r e m e a s u r e d in th e m o n th o f M a r ch ( in 1 9 8 9 t o 1 9 9 3 ) a n d O c t o b e r (1 9 9 4 t o 1 9 9 9 ) .
W e u s e th e fo l low in g s e t o f c o n t r o l s : in d iv id u a l ch a r a c t e r i s t i c s ( y e a r s o f s ch o o l in g ( in le v e l s ) ) j o b q u a l i ty ( t e nu r e
a n d o c cu p a t io n ) , fi rm ch a r a c t e r i s t i c s ( s e c t o r le g a l s e t t in g , e q u ity c a p it a l s h a r e o f fo r e ig n ow n e r s , em p loym en t le v e l ,
y e a r - r e g io n d um m ie s , a n d c o u n ty d um m ie s .
A d um m y fo r c i ty m ove r s i s in c lu d e d , a n d w e a l l ow to in d iv id u a l r e t u rn s t o e d u c a t io n t o ch a n g e ov e r t im e .
S t a n d a rd e r r o r s a r e r e p o r t e d in p a r e n th e s i s w it h * r e p r e s e n t in g a s ig n ifi c a n c e le v e l low e r t h a n 1 0 ,
* * a s ig n ifi c a n c e l e v e l l ow e r t h a n 5 % an d * * * a s ig n ifi c a n c e l e v e l l ow e r t h a n 1% .
T h e e x p r e s s i o n D i f . (var) r e f e r s t o d iﬀ e r e n c e o f t h e va r ia b l e var o b s e rv e d in th e e x t r em e s o f t h e p e r io d .
E d u c a t io n l e v e l o f u n t i l 1 2 ye a r s s ch o o l in g w a s th e c om p a r is o n g r o u p .
C o l le g e r e f e r e s to w o rk e r s w it h m o r e th a n 1 2 y e a r s s ch o o l in g .
S o u r c e : P o r t u g u e s e M in is t r y o f L a b o r a n d S o l id a r i ty, “Q u a d ro s d e P e s s o a l” D a t a s e t .
44
Table 5 - First Diﬀerences: Displaced Workers (1992 & 1993-1995 &1996
and 1992 & 1993 - 1998 & 1999) - Movers vs Stayers
Dep.Var: Dif.(Log of Hourly Wage) (1995 & 1996)-(1992 & 1993) (1998 & 1999)-(1992 & 1993)
t− (t− τ), τ = 3, 6 Wage Eq. only for Wage Eq. only for
Stayers Movers Stayers. Movers
Dif.(Av. County Education) -0.014 -0.037 -0.011 0.040*
(0.018) (0.034) (0.014) (0.024)
Dif.(Av. Firm Education) 0.011*** 0.014*** 0.015 0.017***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Interaction w/ Education
Dif.(Av. County Ed.) -0.014 -0.036 -0.020 0.031
(.019) (0.034) (0.015) (0.024)
D i f . (A v . C o u n ty E d . )X H ig h S ch o o l & C o l le g e 0.001 -0.004 0.060* 0.028***
(0.046) (0.010) (0.035) (0.009)
N. Obs. 15,367 ind.×2 9,232 ind.×2 18,188 ind.×2 11,894 ind.×2
A ll t h e c o n t r o l s a r e d efi n ed a s b e fo r e .
S t a n d a rd e r r o r s a r e r e p o r t e d in p a r e n th e s i s w it h * r e p r e s e n t in g a s ig n ifi c a n c e le v e l low e r t h a n 1 0% ,
* * a s ig n ifi c a n c e l e v e l l ow e r t h a n 5% an d * * * a s ig n ifi c a n c e l e v e l l ow e r t h a n 1% .
T h e e x p r e s s i o n D i f . (var) r e f e r s t o d iﬀ e r e n c e o f t h e va r ia b l e var o b s e rv e d in th e e x t r em e s o f t h e p e r io d .
E d u c a t io n l e v e l o f u n t i l 1 2 ye a r s s ch o o l in g w a s th e c om p a r is o n g r o u p .
C o l le g e r e f e r e s to w o rk e r s w it h m o r e th a n 1 2 y e a r s s ch o o l in g .
S o u r c e : P o r t u g u e s e M in is t r y o f L a b o r a n d S o l id a r i ty, “Q u a d ro s d e P e s s o a l” D a t a s e t .
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Table 6 - First Diﬀerences: Displaced Workers (1992 & 1993-1995 &1996
and 1992 & 1993 - 1998 & 1999) - Interaction with tenure and Education Level
Dep.Var: Dif.(Log of Hourly Wage) (1995 & 1996)-(1992 & 1993) (1998 & 1999)-(1992 & 1993)
Interaction w/ Education and Tenure
Dif.(Av.CityEd.) -0.036** -0.008
(0.016) (0.012)
Dif.(Av.CityEd.)×(HS & Coll.) -0.005 0.029***
(0.008) (0.007)
Dif.(Av.CityEd.)×Tenure 0.0009* 0.001***
(0.0005) (0.0002)
Dif.(Av.CityEd.)×Tenure×(HS & Coll.) 0.003*** 0.001**
(0.0009) (0.0004)
N. Obs. 49,198 Obs. on 24,599 indiv. 60,164 Obs. on 30,082 indiv.
A l l c o n t r o l s a r e t h e s am e a s in th e t a b l e b e fo r e .
S t a n d a rd e r r o r s a r e r e p o r t e d in p a r e n th e s i s w it h * r e p r e s e n t in g a s ig n ifi c a n c e le v e l low e r t h a n 1 0% ,
* * a s ig n ifi c a n c e l e v e l l ow e r t h a n 5% an d * * * a s ig n ifi c a n c e l e v e l l ow e r t h a n 1% .
T h e e x p r e s s i o n D i f . (var) r e f e r s t o d iﬀ e r e n c e o f t h e va r ia b l e var o b s e rv e d in th e e x t r em e s o f t h e p e r io d .
E d u c a t io n l e v e l o f u n t i l 1 2 ye a r s s ch o o l in g w a s th e c om p a r is o n g r o u p .
C o l le g e r e f e r e s to w o rk e r s w it h m o r e th a n 1 2 y e a r s s ch o o l in g .
S o u r c e : P o r t u g u e s e M in is t r y o f L a b o r a n d S o l id a r i ty, “Q u a d ro s d e P e s s o a l” D a t a s e t .
46
B Data Appendix
The empirical work presented in this paper is based on the dataset “Quadros de
Pessoal”, of the Ministry of Labor and Solidarity (MTS). Beginning in 1982 and
on a yearly basis, this Ministry has been collecting information on all companies
operating in Portugal, except family businesses without wage-earning employees,
through a mandatory questionnaire. This dataset covers, roughly, one half of
all the active population. Table A1 reports the number of records for the years
under consideration.
Table 7: Number of records in 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997 and 1999
Year Workers Firms Establishments
1989 2 169 835 137 155 161 094
1991 2 233 237 148 602 173 551
1993 2 215 481 184 306 193 804
1995 2 232 548 192 270 223 393
1997 2 350 782 213 589 248 664
1999 2 568 456 244 241 284 368
The access to this dataset is conditional on the rules presented in the agree-
ment between the University of Minho and the Department of Statistics of the
MTS, and is possible under request.
The dataset is made up of three files:
(i) the workers’ file, with data from 1985 to 1989 and from 1991 to 1998. This
includes the worker’s identification number (social security number), gender,
age, skill, occupation, schooling, tenure, date of the last promotion, profession,
earnings and number of working hours. These information is relative to the
month of March (from 1989 to 1993) or October (from 1994 to now).
(ii) the firms’ file, with data since 1985. The main variables present in
this file are: the firm’s identification number, location (at county level), the
establishment and firm’s identification number, sector, legal setting, type of
agreement between firm and unions, equity capital, share of national owners in
the equity capital, share of foreign owners in the equity capital, share of public
owner in the equity capital, yearly sales, number of establishments (since 1994),
employment level (observed in March, between 1985 and 1993, and observed in
the last week of October, since 1994) and date of the constitution (since 1995).
(iii) the establishments’ file, with the firm’s identification number and that
of the one of the establishment (generated inside each firm), location, sector and
number of employees.
B.1 Variables extracted and / or generated from the dataset
From the dataset, and after merging the three files, we extracted the following
variables:
(i) Information about workers (subscript i denotes worker i):
- Log of the hourly wages: log houri=log
regular monthly earnings before taxes
regular working hours i
.
- Potential experience:
Potexpi =
½
(age - years of education - 5.75), if years of education >= 9
(age-14) if years of education <9
.
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- Gender: variable malei =
½
1 if male
0 if not
.
- Education, dummies for 8 classes of diﬀerent education levels and the
respective correspondence with years of schooling:
Education Level of i Competence Correspondence with years of education
Educ_0 No reading or writing 0
Educ_2 Basic reading or writing 2
Educ_4 Primary school complete 4
Educ_6 Intermediate school 6
Educ_9 Lower high school 9
Educ_12 High school 12
Educ_15 College degree (3 years) 15
Educ_17 College degree (5 years) 17
- Tenure: tenurei = (date of the questionnaire - date of admission), con-
verted to years.
- Generated the dummy variable newi =
½
1 if tenure < 1
0 otherwise
.
- Occupation : 8 diﬀerent levels (converted to dummies):
Occupation Level of i Description
Quali_1 Executive and managerial
Quali_2 Intermediate managerial and executive
Quali_3 Low managerial
Quali_4 Technicians highly specialized
Quali_5 Sales, administrative and precision production
Quali_6 Administrative support, and production
Quali_7 Unskilled
Quali_8 Apprentice
(ii) Information about firms:
- Individual’s i firm’s average education i: edfirmi =
(
PJ
j educj)
J−1 , and j 6= i,
where J is total level of employment in the i’s firm.
- Firm’s legal setting:
Var. Legal setting
Legal_1 firm owned by the state
Legal_2 private firm - individual owner
Legal_3 private firm - collective owner
Legal_4 cooperative
Legal_5 non profit organization
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- Sector (one dummy for each sector):
Sector Description Sector Description
1 Agriculture and fishery (dropped) 13 Water, electricity and gas
2 Mining 14 Construction
3 Food, beverages and tobacco 15 Services concerning vehicles
4 Textiles 16 Wholesale
5 Leather 17 Retail
6 Wood products and cork (without furniture) 18 Hotels and restaurants
7 Paper and printing 19 Transportation services and communications
8 Petroleum refining, rubber, plastics and chemicals 20 Banking and insurance services
9 Other non-metallic mineral products 21 Other business and professional services
10 Iron and steel 22 Real estate
11 Metal products and machinery 23 Other services
12 Furniture and other manufacturing
- Level of employment: npessm : employment level (observed in March,
between 1985 and 1993, and observed in the last week of October, since 1994).
- pkestr share of foreign equity capital.
(iii) Information about localization:
- Average education of the i’s city= edcityi =
(
PC
c educc)
C−1 , where C is total
level of employment in the i’s city. We do not take into account workers with
double identification numbers or with no information about schooling level.
- Log of the City employment: logEmpi = log(employment observed in city
of the worker i, in the private sector).
- Log of the City Sales per capitaemployment:
logSalesi = log
h
(summation of the sales of all firms located in the i0s city)
(employment observed in the city of the worker i, in the private sector)
i
.
- Region of the establishment (dummy variables):
regio_1 if the estab. is located in the Region “Norte”
regio_2 if the estab. is located in the Region “Centro”
regio_3 if the estab. is located in Lisbon or neighborhood districts (Setubal or Santarem)
regio_4 if the estab. is located in the Region “Alentejo”
regio_5 if the estab. is located in the Region “Algarve”
B.2 Observations extracted from the original dataset
From the original dataset, we selected the observations on the following basis.
First we dropped part-time workers as well as workers that did not work the
normal period in the month of the survey (about 22% of whole sample). Recall
that the information on social security numbers is not validated because is not
used for the production of oﬃcial statistics and consequently there are some
coding error and missing observations. Therefore, we dropped all observations
without a valid identification number (from 7% in 1989, to 3% in 1999) and
dropped individuals whose identification number appear twice or more, after
keeping the full-time workers. This is a suspicion of a typo or a mistake when
the data was introduced, but also could be the case that some individuals have
more than one full time job. Note that if some workers have a full-time job and
a part-time one, than the information related with the later job is deleted, while
we maintain the former.
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Then we retained only the workers in firms with more than six employees,
non agriculture or fishery, and located in the continental part of Portugal. Table
A2 summarizes the average hourly wages as well as the (weighted) average
county education.
Table 8: Information extracted from the original dataset from 1989 to 1999
Year Original Dataset Final dataset
N r . o f o b s e r . N om . h o u r ly w a g e s A v . C i ty E d u c a t io n N r . o f o b s e r . N om . h o u r ly w a g e s A v . C i ty E d u c a t io n
1989 2.169.835 335.8 5.86 234.032 345,9 5.95
1991 2.233.237 485.1 6.19 247.800 506.6 6.25
1993 2.215.481 612.5 6.46 250.178 634.0 6.56
1995 2.232.548 698.4 6.75 267.020 730.4 6.82
1997 2.350.782 772.0 7.07 283.277 799.5 7.15
1999 2.568.456 885.4 7.43 293.391 917.3 7.51
For the sample of displaced workers, we merge two sub-samples: one sample
with individuals that lost their jobs because of firm closings in 1993 and the
other with individuals that lost their jobs because of firm closings in 1994. We
assumed that we observe a firm closing if the identification number of one firm
appeared in 1992 but did not appear in 1993, for the first sub-sample, and if
the identification number of one firm appeared in 1993 but did not appear in
1994, for the first sub-sample. However it is possible that some firms changed
the id. number due to mergers or splits. Therefore, we dropped all workers for
whom the date of admission (observed in 1995 and 1998 or observed in 1996 and
1999) was before March 1992 or March 1993 (about 1/3 of the sample). Table
A3 summarizes the information available from this sample.
Table 9: Information about displaced workers from firm closures (displace-
ment in 1993)
Year Nr. of obser. Hourly wages Av. Worker Education Av. Worker Age
(nominal) (Years of schooling) (Years)
1992 46,440 422.4 5.66 36.3
1995 13,699 552.0 6.35 35.0
1998 16,104 711.5 6.61 37.0
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Table 10: Information about displaced workers from firm closures (displace-
ment in 1994)
Year Nr. of obser. Hourly wages Av. Worker Education Av. Worker Age
(nominal) (Years of schooling) (Years)
1993 103,653 707.1 6.73 38.7
1996 19,940 631.5 6.66 36.0
1999 24,784 777.4 6.74 38.0
B.3 Descriptive statistics
The following tables describe this panel in more detail.
Table 11: Cities’ Average Education and Hourly Wage (not weighted)
(1) City Average Education (2) County Av. Hourly Wage
N = 275 Mean Stand. DevMean . Range Mean
Stand. Dev
Mean Range
1989 5.44 0.17 3.69 - 9.00 291.5 0.13 191 - 750
1991 5.61 0.24 3.33 - 8.07 422.2 0.12 274 - 1,116
1993 5.89 0.21 4.24 - 9.00 511.4 0.12 339 - 1,035
1995 6.21 0.21 3.70 - 8.80 596.8 0.11 386 - 1,251
1997 6.50 0.19 4.81 - 9.22 657.3 0.11 452 - 1,232
1999 6.75 0.18 5.16 - 9.74 730.9 0.10 535 - 1,436
Note: Hourly wage was computed from monthly earnings in March, from 1989
to 1993 and October from 1994 to 1999. Unit: Portuguese Escudos.
Source: Portuguese Ministry of Labor and Solidarity (“Quadros de Pessoal”).
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